For the class I TA the students had to create a constitutional amendment. There were plenty of fairly frivolous ones reflecting a distinct college freshman outlook (lower the drinking age, etc). The most popular choice was a gay marriage amendment. A couple others that were surprisingly popular were a balanced budget amendment (which would be horrible policy but it sounds good!) and a drug testing amendment for everyone receiving public assistance. This one was fairly shocking to me. I don't think it occured to the students that most of them would have to be tested (pell grants or federally subsidized student loans) and their grandmothers too (medicare and social security above what they paid in). I'm being too literal, of course. We all know that only certain kinds of government handouts, to certain kinds of people, "count" as handouts. All the rest is the just deserts of a hardworking citizenry.
Anyway, that was all prelude to the constitutional amendment I would propose if given the chance. At first I thought something to do with education would be useful, to require the breakdown of our immoral system of segregation and inequality. But actually doing that via constitutional amendment could get extremely complicated really fast and could cause more harm than good. I'll leave that to others to think through. My amendment has the advantage of being at once desperately needed and extremely simple, with zero negative externalities.
It's simply this: we need a constitutional right to vote. Most people probably aren't aware that we don't already have one. We should pass an amendment that establishes an unequivocal and unalienable right to vote. (Yes, serial killers on death row would be able to vote. Get all your outrage out now.) What a robust and explicit right in the constitution would do, I imagine, is make it much more difficult for states to try, as they are now, all sorts of underhanded tactics to reduce voting participation.
This amendment would not have a chance at this point, though. The reason is that the White countermovement that defeated the civil rights movement decades ago is still active. People don't realize that there is a proud American tradition, embraced by many of the founders, that sees voting by common people as deeply dangerous. The thing that is so frustrating about the current political climate is that average people have so thoroughly rejected those anti-democratic norms that the proponents of vote suppression have to invent causes out of whole cloth: now they're "protecting" the vote and ensuring its "integrity," preventing "fraud." It's so deeply cynical and disgusting.
The racial component of this is interesting too. For many states, one of the major perks of their vote restrictions is that they disenfranchise astonishing percentages of their Black population because they don't allow felons to vote, in some cases even those who have served their time. (Of course, these people often wind up in the system in the first place because of racism.) There is perhaps no other area of public policy in which the gap between rhetoric and reality is so large. The vote suppression laws that are rampant now are racist laws. Yet in many quarters being honest about these basic facts is the offense, not the laws themselves. John Stennis would be so proud.
Sunday, November 3, 2013
Monday, October 7, 2013
Book Review: Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World
In the absence of normal blog content, I'm reduced to publishing one of my book reviews. I really do want to keep the blog up, but it's difficult right now.
Thornton, John. Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800. 2nd Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Originally published in 1992, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World appeared at a historiographical moment in which Africans had gained historians’ sympathy as victims, if not always their attention as historical actors. Thornton argues that African states, African institutions, and Africans themselves on both sides of the Atlantic, acting as dynamic participants rather than passive victims, were integral to the creation of an Atlantic world. His overarching concern is to establish the agency of Africans in the context of this emerging Atlantic milieu. In such a project the question of the slave trade looms large, and Thornton returns to it repeatedly, contending that the trans-Atlantic slave trade was a function of African agency rather than a negation of it. He also emphasizes the ways in which the African economy and African social systems affected Atlantic trade more broadly, and traces the transmission of African culture to the Americas.
Thornton divides the book into two parts, reflecting the Atlantic reach of his study: “Africans in Africa,” and “Africans in the New World.” The first part of the book focuses heavily on African state, economic, and social institutions, emphasizing how the internal dynamics of the African continent, rather than outside European pressure, explain key developments in the rise of an Atlantic World. This section includes chapters on African social structures pertaining to slavery, and the transatlantic slave trade itself. He convincingly argues that the African economy was more productive than much of the scholarship has acknowledged, bolstering his case with compelling evidence such as the vast cloth exports from eastern Kongo and advanced iron production in West Africa. The relative prosperity of Africa is an important point for Thornton to establish, for it underlies his claim that, far from being dependent on European imports, Africans engaged in a supplemental trade with Europe primarily for luxury goods. An African continent with the economic and military power to dictate the terms of its involvement with Europe is a key context for Thornton’s understanding of the slave trade.
The other vital backgrounds Thornton establishes are the structures and traditions of African societies pertaining to slavery, from property rights to war-making. In order to argue that Africans engaged in the slave trade willingly, on their own terms and to their own advantage, he seeks to demonstrate that preexisting African practices were well-suited to adaption to a trans-Atlantic slave trade. He is particularly convincing in his discussion of the ways in which property in people in the African context was roughly equivalent to property in land in the European context. By the same token, African states engaging in slave-raiding can be seen as conducting “wars of conquest” in much the same way European states sought to do through territorial aggrandizement (102). By demonstrating the embedded structures of slavery within African societies, Thornton offers a portrait of the slave trade that makes sense on African terms. He concludes that the rise of a massive trans-Atlantic trade in slaves owed at least as much to the internal dynamics of African societies as any external pressure from Europeans.
In the second part of the book Thornton follows Africans to the Americas and treats them as productive partners rather than passive victims in the formation of the economic, religious, and cultural landscape of the Western Hemisphere. The crucial economic role of African slaves in the American colonies is well known, the persistence of African religion and culture, less so. Thornton frames African religious adaptation not as a process of conversion to European religion but as the formation of a new African Christianity. He also challenges historiography that emphasizes the cultural breach that accompanied the process of enslavement and the subsequent dislocation that occurred in the unfamiliar Americas, arguing that African culture persisted to a greater degree than much of the scholarship has acknowledged. He convincingly shows that slave ship populations were frequently drawn from common cultural areas and usually disembarked in large groups. Thus the randomization and resulting cultural isolation that some scholars posited has been overstated. To the extent that it did occur, Thornton notes that ruptured social structures did not necessarily lead to drastic cultural loss, as the very ubiquity of slavery in Africa meant that Africans were accustomed to building ties around relationships other than kinship. He acknowledges that Africans underwent significant cultural change in the Americas but reframes it as a case of deliberate African adaptation rather than European imposition.
Thornton’s work raises powerful questions about the nature of victimhood and historical agency. As he vigorously debunks the status of Africans as mere objects to be acted upon in the Atlantic World, one might reasonably ask what is lost or gained in shedding old labels. One need not join Henry Louis Gates in extreme and anachronistic assertions about the slave trade as a “black on black holocaust” to recognize that trading victimization for agency carries with it complex historical and political implications, especially on a subject as fraught as the slave trade. In portraying Africans as full and willing participants in the creation of the Atlantic world, does Thornton appropriately contextualize a story of agency amid oppression? Or does he, at times, fall into downplaying external coercion in his zeal to establish agency? Readers may well disagree on these questions. On the one hand, his discussion of rape in the Americas takes a questionable turn when he describes females slaves using the “sexual game” (itself an odd phrase) to advance their interests. “No doubt many women did not welcome the sexual advances of their masters,” he acknowledges, but concludes: “On some occasions slaves appear to have been raped by their masters; in others it was apparently a voluntary participation” (181-82). In this instance, Thornton’s desire to emphasize the choices of enslaved African women leads him to submerge the oppressive context that rendered those choices less than free. On the other hand, the chapter on “Resistance, runaways, and rebels” in the Americas offers a delicately told narrative of agency amid oppression. If Thornton’s balance fails him one or twice, it is only a testament to the difficulty inherent in writing about individual human agency in a world defined by stark disparities of power.
Thornton necessarily makes use of many European, especially Portuguese and Spanish, sources. Yet his expertise on West Africa shines through, as he contextualizes the sources with demographic reconstructions, archaeology, and other sources that show the Europeans are often as revealing for what they got wrong as what they got right. Thornton carries on a robust conversation with various streams of historiography and does an excellent job bringing them in front of even the uninitiated reader. When introducing a new subject, he regularly poses a question and then briefly traces the historiography of the question, naming two or three historians whose work exemplifies the debate. As its status as a textbook has made clear, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World is clear, cogently argued, and a useful introductory text for undergraduate and graduate students. It should, however, be read as the incisive corrective that it is rather than a comprehensive perspective on Africans’ place in the Atlantic world.
Thornton, John. Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800. 2nd Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Originally published in 1992, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World appeared at a historiographical moment in which Africans had gained historians’ sympathy as victims, if not always their attention as historical actors. Thornton argues that African states, African institutions, and Africans themselves on both sides of the Atlantic, acting as dynamic participants rather than passive victims, were integral to the creation of an Atlantic world. His overarching concern is to establish the agency of Africans in the context of this emerging Atlantic milieu. In such a project the question of the slave trade looms large, and Thornton returns to it repeatedly, contending that the trans-Atlantic slave trade was a function of African agency rather than a negation of it. He also emphasizes the ways in which the African economy and African social systems affected Atlantic trade more broadly, and traces the transmission of African culture to the Americas.
Thornton divides the book into two parts, reflecting the Atlantic reach of his study: “Africans in Africa,” and “Africans in the New World.” The first part of the book focuses heavily on African state, economic, and social institutions, emphasizing how the internal dynamics of the African continent, rather than outside European pressure, explain key developments in the rise of an Atlantic World. This section includes chapters on African social structures pertaining to slavery, and the transatlantic slave trade itself. He convincingly argues that the African economy was more productive than much of the scholarship has acknowledged, bolstering his case with compelling evidence such as the vast cloth exports from eastern Kongo and advanced iron production in West Africa. The relative prosperity of Africa is an important point for Thornton to establish, for it underlies his claim that, far from being dependent on European imports, Africans engaged in a supplemental trade with Europe primarily for luxury goods. An African continent with the economic and military power to dictate the terms of its involvement with Europe is a key context for Thornton’s understanding of the slave trade.
The other vital backgrounds Thornton establishes are the structures and traditions of African societies pertaining to slavery, from property rights to war-making. In order to argue that Africans engaged in the slave trade willingly, on their own terms and to their own advantage, he seeks to demonstrate that preexisting African practices were well-suited to adaption to a trans-Atlantic slave trade. He is particularly convincing in his discussion of the ways in which property in people in the African context was roughly equivalent to property in land in the European context. By the same token, African states engaging in slave-raiding can be seen as conducting “wars of conquest” in much the same way European states sought to do through territorial aggrandizement (102). By demonstrating the embedded structures of slavery within African societies, Thornton offers a portrait of the slave trade that makes sense on African terms. He concludes that the rise of a massive trans-Atlantic trade in slaves owed at least as much to the internal dynamics of African societies as any external pressure from Europeans.
In the second part of the book Thornton follows Africans to the Americas and treats them as productive partners rather than passive victims in the formation of the economic, religious, and cultural landscape of the Western Hemisphere. The crucial economic role of African slaves in the American colonies is well known, the persistence of African religion and culture, less so. Thornton frames African religious adaptation not as a process of conversion to European religion but as the formation of a new African Christianity. He also challenges historiography that emphasizes the cultural breach that accompanied the process of enslavement and the subsequent dislocation that occurred in the unfamiliar Americas, arguing that African culture persisted to a greater degree than much of the scholarship has acknowledged. He convincingly shows that slave ship populations were frequently drawn from common cultural areas and usually disembarked in large groups. Thus the randomization and resulting cultural isolation that some scholars posited has been overstated. To the extent that it did occur, Thornton notes that ruptured social structures did not necessarily lead to drastic cultural loss, as the very ubiquity of slavery in Africa meant that Africans were accustomed to building ties around relationships other than kinship. He acknowledges that Africans underwent significant cultural change in the Americas but reframes it as a case of deliberate African adaptation rather than European imposition.
Thornton’s work raises powerful questions about the nature of victimhood and historical agency. As he vigorously debunks the status of Africans as mere objects to be acted upon in the Atlantic World, one might reasonably ask what is lost or gained in shedding old labels. One need not join Henry Louis Gates in extreme and anachronistic assertions about the slave trade as a “black on black holocaust” to recognize that trading victimization for agency carries with it complex historical and political implications, especially on a subject as fraught as the slave trade. In portraying Africans as full and willing participants in the creation of the Atlantic world, does Thornton appropriately contextualize a story of agency amid oppression? Or does he, at times, fall into downplaying external coercion in his zeal to establish agency? Readers may well disagree on these questions. On the one hand, his discussion of rape in the Americas takes a questionable turn when he describes females slaves using the “sexual game” (itself an odd phrase) to advance their interests. “No doubt many women did not welcome the sexual advances of their masters,” he acknowledges, but concludes: “On some occasions slaves appear to have been raped by their masters; in others it was apparently a voluntary participation” (181-82). In this instance, Thornton’s desire to emphasize the choices of enslaved African women leads him to submerge the oppressive context that rendered those choices less than free. On the other hand, the chapter on “Resistance, runaways, and rebels” in the Americas offers a delicately told narrative of agency amid oppression. If Thornton’s balance fails him one or twice, it is only a testament to the difficulty inherent in writing about individual human agency in a world defined by stark disparities of power.
Thornton necessarily makes use of many European, especially Portuguese and Spanish, sources. Yet his expertise on West Africa shines through, as he contextualizes the sources with demographic reconstructions, archaeology, and other sources that show the Europeans are often as revealing for what they got wrong as what they got right. Thornton carries on a robust conversation with various streams of historiography and does an excellent job bringing them in front of even the uninitiated reader. When introducing a new subject, he regularly poses a question and then briefly traces the historiography of the question, naming two or three historians whose work exemplifies the debate. As its status as a textbook has made clear, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World is clear, cogently argued, and a useful introductory text for undergraduate and graduate students. It should, however, be read as the incisive corrective that it is rather than a comprehensive perspective on Africans’ place in the Atlantic world.
Thursday, September 26, 2013
In 1965, William F. Buckley Threatened a Race War
(But don't worry. He assured his audience that Whites would have the best interests of Blacks at heart as they fought them).
Ta-Nehisi Coates linked to this a couple days ago. It turns out that William F. Buckley and James Baldwin went across the pond in 1965 and had a debate at Cambridge on the question: "Is the American Dream at the Expense of the American Negro?" Buckley, that vaunted conservative founding father, got his clock cleaned by the gay Black man.
Baldwin's oration was moving on an emotional level, but was undergirded by a really big intellectual idea about the nature of reality and how we perceive it. Buckley claimed that he essentially agreed with all the moral sensibilities of the civil rights movement but disagreed about the way to go about it. He was laughed at repeatedly, and even took a couple crass personal shots on Baldwin himself. By the end, he was reduced to arguing that Black activists were threatening traditional American principles of economy and government, and that their gains must not be made at the expense of the American way of life. If forced to choose between American principles and Black rights, he warned, White Americans would choose the former, and be willing to fight for them.
So ironically, he ended up arguing the very opposite of what he set out to defend: that the American Dream was not at the expense of the Negro. Perhaps, his argument was more nuanced. The American Dream was not at the expense of the Negro, but radical Black activists threatened to make it so. So, yeah, it's all Black people's fault. The most astonishing thing about the end of Buckley's speech is that he compares a theoretical war between White and Black Americans to Britain's war against Nazi Germany. You can guess which group is the British and which group is the Nazis in this American scenario.
This is astonishing, even though I already knew about his pro-segregationist editorials in the 1950s. This is one of the most influential and respected intellectual figures in the rise of modern conservatism. And modern conservatism has yet to grapple with the true nature of its intellectual inheritance.
But its also a much broader question than conservatism. We should think about the degree to which Buckley was right. Of course he was wrong in envisioning an apocalyptic war. But his bigger point -- that White Americans would always choose what they consider to be the essential American way of life over Black rights when they are perceived to be in conflict -- has not been disproven. If anything, it has been borne out. The broadest economic indicators reveal that Blacks have made no meaningful progress in relation to Whites since the civil rights movement. White economic supremacy remains unchallenged. The systemically unequal education structure remains unchallenged. To combat these and other issues would require steps that many Americans might consider a departure from the American Way. What Buckley perhaps didn't realize is that Whites would be able to defeat the push for racial equality without needing to resort to violence. Speaking in 1965, he didn't yet realize just how strong his position was and how many Americans agreed with him.
Ta-Nehisi Coates linked to this a couple days ago. It turns out that William F. Buckley and James Baldwin went across the pond in 1965 and had a debate at Cambridge on the question: "Is the American Dream at the Expense of the American Negro?" Buckley, that vaunted conservative founding father, got his clock cleaned by the gay Black man.
Baldwin's oration was moving on an emotional level, but was undergirded by a really big intellectual idea about the nature of reality and how we perceive it. Buckley claimed that he essentially agreed with all the moral sensibilities of the civil rights movement but disagreed about the way to go about it. He was laughed at repeatedly, and even took a couple crass personal shots on Baldwin himself. By the end, he was reduced to arguing that Black activists were threatening traditional American principles of economy and government, and that their gains must not be made at the expense of the American way of life. If forced to choose between American principles and Black rights, he warned, White Americans would choose the former, and be willing to fight for them.
So ironically, he ended up arguing the very opposite of what he set out to defend: that the American Dream was not at the expense of the Negro. Perhaps, his argument was more nuanced. The American Dream was not at the expense of the Negro, but radical Black activists threatened to make it so. So, yeah, it's all Black people's fault. The most astonishing thing about the end of Buckley's speech is that he compares a theoretical war between White and Black Americans to Britain's war against Nazi Germany. You can guess which group is the British and which group is the Nazis in this American scenario.
This is astonishing, even though I already knew about his pro-segregationist editorials in the 1950s. This is one of the most influential and respected intellectual figures in the rise of modern conservatism. And modern conservatism has yet to grapple with the true nature of its intellectual inheritance.
But its also a much broader question than conservatism. We should think about the degree to which Buckley was right. Of course he was wrong in envisioning an apocalyptic war. But his bigger point -- that White Americans would always choose what they consider to be the essential American way of life over Black rights when they are perceived to be in conflict -- has not been disproven. If anything, it has been borne out. The broadest economic indicators reveal that Blacks have made no meaningful progress in relation to Whites since the civil rights movement. White economic supremacy remains unchallenged. The systemically unequal education structure remains unchallenged. To combat these and other issues would require steps that many Americans might consider a departure from the American Way. What Buckley perhaps didn't realize is that Whites would be able to defeat the push for racial equality without needing to resort to violence. Speaking in 1965, he didn't yet realize just how strong his position was and how many Americans agreed with him.
Sunday, September 1, 2013
Thoughts for Sunday
Another selection from Langston Hughes:
To Certain "Brothers"
You sicken me with lies,
With truthful lies.
And with your pious faces.
And your wide, out-stretched,
mock-welcome, Christian hands.
While underneath
Is dirt and ugliness,
And rottening hearts,
And wild hyenas howling
In your soul's waste lands.
To Certain "Brothers"
You sicken me with lies,
With truthful lies.
And with your pious faces.
And your wide, out-stretched,
mock-welcome, Christian hands.
While underneath
Is dirt and ugliness,
And rottening hearts,
And wild hyenas howling
In your soul's waste lands.
Thursday, August 29, 2013
In Commemoration Speech, Did Obama Serve the Cause of Justice, or Myth?
I wasn't sure what to make of President Obama's speech yesterday at the commemoration of the March on Washington. Parts of it were forthright about the need for further action to combat injustice (and the President actually used that word). And he talked about the need to defeat the (conveniently unnamed) defenders of such injustice. I don't know enough about presidential rhetoric, and perhaps I'm just conditioned by the Bush years, but I was starting to think sitting Presidents don't talk like this.
But then Obama pivoted back to this:
After suffering a series of severe blows, White regrouped and defeated the civil rights movement. Yet the discourse of Whites ever since has not acknowledged their partial victory. There is, rather, a pervasive set of mental and rhetorical frameworks built around blaming Blacks for their failure to live up to "the Dream," as if Whites have not been standing in their way the whole time. President Obama is aiding and abetting those frameworks.
Perhaps he should have called for specific policies, invoking King's name, urging congress to pass immigration reform in pursuit of King's Dream. Pass a jobs bill in pursuit of King's dream. Pass criminal justice reform in pursuit of King's Dream. Denounce the racist tea party, in honor of King. I don't know. Maybe all hell would break loose if he did that. But I think it would be a good thing if King became more controversial again. King would be appalled by the modern Republican Party. He would denounce it in moral, biblical terms. I think we should get that out in the open and let people draw their own conclusions.
But then Obama pivoted back to this:
And then, if we're honest with ourselves, we'll admit that during the course of 50 years, there were times when some of us claiming to push for change lost our way. The anguish of assassinations set off self-defeating riots. Legitimate grievances against police brutality tipped into excuse-making for criminal behavior. Racial politics could cut both ways, as the transformative message of unity and brotherhood was drowned out by the language of recrimination. And what had once been a call for equality of opportunity, the chance for all Americans to work hard and get ahead was too often framed as a mere desire for government support -- as if we had no agency in our own liberation, as if poverty was an excuse for not raising your child, and the bigotry of others was reason to give up on yourself.I'm never sure what to make of this coming from Obama. Is it part of his habitual "on the one hand, on the other hand" framing of every issue? Is it what he feels he has to say as the President of all Americans? Or is it, deep down, what he believes? I'm not here to say that there is no truth at all to this paragraph (though Ta-Nehisi Coates, in a must read scathing review, says as much) but I do argue that this rhetoric is received in a certain social and cultural context that renders it, in its essence, untrue.
After suffering a series of severe blows, White regrouped and defeated the civil rights movement. Yet the discourse of Whites ever since has not acknowledged their partial victory. There is, rather, a pervasive set of mental and rhetorical frameworks built around blaming Blacks for their failure to live up to "the Dream," as if Whites have not been standing in their way the whole time. President Obama is aiding and abetting those frameworks.
Perhaps he should have called for specific policies, invoking King's name, urging congress to pass immigration reform in pursuit of King's Dream. Pass a jobs bill in pursuit of King's dream. Pass criminal justice reform in pursuit of King's Dream. Denounce the racist tea party, in honor of King. I don't know. Maybe all hell would break loose if he did that. But I think it would be a good thing if King became more controversial again. King would be appalled by the modern Republican Party. He would denounce it in moral, biblical terms. I think we should get that out in the open and let people draw their own conclusions.
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